U.S. Civil War History & Genealogy

The Devil's To Pay

Part Two
By Tom Gladwell


Continued from Part One: http://www.genealogyforum.rootsweb.com/gfaol/resource/Military/Devil.htm



FIRST SHOTS "THAT'S THE MATTER"

In establishing his defense line, Buford had taken care to provide an early warning system of pickets and videttes (4 to 5 man patrols). A half mile to the west of McPherson's Ridge was Herr and Belmont School Ridge, and a mile beyond that, Whisler's Ridge (known today as Knoxlyn Ridge). This latter ridge overlooked Marsh Creek and was intersected by the Chambersburg Pike, down which the Confederates would pass from Cashtown. That night, Union Pickets and videttes had been placed along Whisler's Ridge, which was only a half mile from Heath's pickets and four miles from A.P. Hill's headquarters.

At dawn, the officer in charge of pickets along the Pike itself was Lieutenant Marcellus Jones of Company E, 8th Illinois Cavalry. After inspecting his men, Jones retired a few hundred yards to the rear to breakfast on a loaf of bread and butter. No sooner had he began to eat than an excited trooper rode up to say that he was wanted back at the vidette post "at once." Upon arrival, he was greeted with the sight of Heath's column rolling relentlessly toward him down the pike. Jones notified his regimental commander, and then at 7;30 a.m. borrowed a carbine from Sergeant Levi Shaffer and fired a shot at "an officer on a white or light gray horse." With that shot, the Battle of Gettysburg had begun.

Meanwhile, to the north of town, Devin's pickets had begun exchanging shots with skirmishers from General Robert Rode's Divisions, now across the mountains and leading Ewell's Corps in from Carlisle and York. Although it would be some time before this division reached the field, Devin's were now beginning to feel the pressure. Back in town, in the company of his brigade commanders, John Buford received word of the Confederate advance at about 8:00 a.m. At last, the business had begun. The Rebels were indeed coming, they were booming, with still no sign of John Reynolds and the Union infantry. Buford could hear the sounds of firing as he hastily left the Eagle Hotel to ride to the Lutheran Seminary. In departing, a staff officer asked him what was the matter. Buford nodded in the direction of the firing. " That's the matter," he snapped.


HIDE AND SEEK

Back on the Cashtown Pike, the Union warning shot provoked a reaction from the approaching column. Colonel Birkett Fry, the commander of the lead regiment (13th Alabama) had already unfurled his colors. At the sound of the shot, brigade commander James Archer ordered two hundred skirmishers thrown out to contest the impudent Yankees. While these troops moved forward, artillery commander Willie Pegram unlimbered his guns and threw a few rounds in the direction of Whisler's Ridge, thereby flushing some 8th Ill. troopers from the trees.

The fighting that now began would bear little resemblance to the vicious slugging match between infantry later that day. Rather it resembled a game of hide and seek, with Gamble's pickets falling back slowly while Archer's skirmishers advanced somewhat cautiously. Since the Confederates took few casualties during this phase, their battle accounts tend to make light of the resistance put up by Buford's cavalry. This attitude is best illustrated by Major Van de Graft, commander of the 5th Alabama Battalion, who afterwards stated that he "lost only seven wounded men, although we drove the cavalry pickets and skirmishers over three miles."

But of course, the major and his fellow Confederates missed the point of the game that Buford was playing. The intelligence failure of their own cavalry left them in the dark as to the importance of the high ground to the South and the race that was being run under their noses to seize it. Buford was fighting to buy time, not to bloody Rebel noses. Heth's men would eat up two and a half hours in driving his pickets back a mile and a half from Whisler's to McPherson's Ridge. In the meantime, Reynolds and the Union 1st Corps were pounding up the Emmitsburg Road, coming closer with each precious minute.

And so, Buford's pickets grudgingly gave way. Lt. Amasa Dana of the 8th Ill. recalled being forced out of three successive positions during the retreat from Herr's and Belmont School Ridges. Along the way, he and his men put on a classic and masterful display of Civil War dismounted delaying tactics, in Dana's words: "I could see the enemy skirmish line reaching from left to right for a distance of a mile and a half, dismounting my entire company and sending the horses to the rear, I called in the pickets and formed the first line of twenty men including myself.... The enemy advanced slow and cautiously. Our first position proved to be well taken. In front was a large open field. Scattering my men to the left and right at intervals of thirty feet and behind post and rail fences, I directed them to throw their carbine sights up for 800 yards. We gave the enemy the benefit of long range practice.... The firing was rapid from our carbines, and induced the belief of four times the number actually present."

As the Confederates approached the Belmont School Ridge, General Buford sent Colonel Gamble with three to four hundred troopers to the outer line in an attempt to slow them down. In response, General Heth ordered Davis Brigade to supply one hundred skirmishers to assist Archer's two hundred in speeding things up. Clearly, Heth was becoming irritated. Although under orders from Lee not to bring on a general engagement, he was angered by the handful of cavalry that had slowed his 6,700 man division to a crawl within three miles of town. Unfortunately, his reinforcements were too few, and Gamble's stand goaded him into a fateful decision. Instead of merely doubling or tripling his skirmishers, Heth now brought the column to a halt in order to deploy the two lead brigades into full line of battle, an evolution that consumed thirty good minutes. At approximately 9:30 a.m., while Heth's infantry formed their 3,000 man front, Archer's Alabamians and Tennesseans to the south of the pike, Davis's Mississippi and North Carolinians to the north, Will Pegram brought his guns to Herr Ridge to begin a thirty minute bombardment of Buford's main battle line. As Gamble's men fell back across Willoughby Run toward McPherson's Ridge, all knew the game of hide and seek as over.


"THE DEVIL'S TO PAY"

Throughout the morning, Buford had given Colonel Devin more or less a free hand to the North while he himself remained close to Gamble's position near the Chambersburg Pike. During this time he moved to and fro between McPherson's Ridge and the Lutheran Seminary cupola, manned by signal officer Jerome. As Heth drew nearer, he began juggling his regiments in preparation for the inevitable crunch.

By 9:30 A.M. or so, Buford's battle line along McPherson's Ridge was virtually set. On the left was his largest regiment, the 8th NY, which held the ridge south of Herbst Woods (today called Reynolds Woods) to the Fairfield Road. Next in line was the 8th Ill, posted to the south of the pike; the hybrid 3rd Indiana and 12th Illinois, posted to the south of the pike to the unfinished railroad cut that ran parallel; across the cut was Devin's 6th NY which extended the line further north nearly to Oak Hill. Sometime earlier, Buford had brought down from the North three companies of the 9th NY to reinforce the 6th NY, and two companies of the 17th PA to protect Calef's guns, which he had deployed in a tactical spread two guns to the north of the pike, two just to the south of it, and two more 500 yards further to the South. Finally, while the position of the two West Virginia companies is uncertain, it is possible that they were used to reinforce the 6th New York.

For this next critical phase, Buford had assembled some 2,000 troopers on a line stretching from the Fairfield Road nearly to Oak Hill. Of course, every fourth man would be serving as a horse holder, thereby reducing his effective fighting force to a figure nearer 1,500. On the ridge opposite were two full brigades of enemy infantry, with two more in reserve. Buford's 1,500 would be outnumbered two to one in the initial assault, and then four and a half to one if Heth chose to throw in his full complement before the Union infantry could arrive. In the duel of artillery, Clef's six 3 inch rifles would be outgunned three to one, in weight as well as numbers.

As he readied the line, Buford was gravely concerned. His anxieties are generally reflected in the following message to General Meade, a message curiously sent at 10:10 A.M., although it seems to describe the tactical situation of an hour earlier: "The enemies force (A.P. Hill's) are advancing on at this point and driving my pickets and skirmishers very rapidly. There is also a large force at Heidlersburg that is driving my pickets at that point from that direction. General Reynolds is advancing and is within three miles of this point with his leading division. I am positive that the whole of A.P. Hill's force is advancing."

By the time the Rebels pushed across Belmont School Ridge, Buford knew that he was approaching the end of his tether. His delaying tactics had bought time, precious time; and yet, if he was not reinforced soon, all would be lost. Indeed, by the time Heth's brigades began forming and Pegram opened his barrage, Buford was on the horns of a dilemna. Once aroused, Heth's division could roll through town like a freight train. If he seriously tried to stop it, all alone, his brigades would be badly mauled, if not destroyed. At this point, with the enemy a mile away, Buford still had the option of mounting up and riding out, without fear of pursuit. Given the odds he was facing, no one would fault his courage if he did. What he needed just then was some word from John Reynolds.

And he got it. Although historians dispute the time and place of their meeting, few will deny that John Reynolds rode into town in advance of the infantry and conferred with Buford at some point prior to the lifting of Pegram's barrage at 10:00 A.M. There are at least three different accounts of the meeting, but the most detailed, and the one generally given credence is that of Buford's signal officer.

In this account, observing from the Lutheran Seminary Cupola, Lt. Jerome spotted General Reynolds and his staff riding in "at a gallop" from the Southeast. The signal officer notified Buford, who then joined him in the cupola. Looking through a telescopic glass, Buford spied Reynolds and remarked, "Now we can hold this place." Reynolds then reined in at the Seminary and called up, "What's the matter, John?" "The devils to pay!" After descending, Buford was asked if he could hold out until the infantry arrived, to which he laconically responded, "I reckon I can." The signal officer remembered Buford warning Reynolds not to expose himself to enemy fire, which elicited a laugh from the later as the two generals trotted off to examine the line.

Whatever thoughts Buford may have entertained concerning a withdrawal were moot after this meeting with Reynolds, who afterwards galloped back to his infantry, which were then near the Round Tops to the South. Buford now turned his attention to the task of steadying his men for the coming attack. In later years, a 6th NY trooper would never forget the sight of the general riding calmly among the guns on "an old white horse, " trailed by his bugler, seemingly indifferent to the shells exploding all around. John Calef would ever remember Buford's cool, matter of fact explanation of the business at hand: "Our men are in a pretty hot pocket, but, my boy, we must hold this position until the infantry come, then you withdraw your guns in each section by piece, fill your limber chest from the caisson and await orders." For his own part, the young Lieutenant performed brilliantly in answering Pegram's guns, and John Buford later praised him as he did few others.

Calef's men fought on this occasion as is seldom witnessed. At one time, the enemy had a concentric fire upon this battery from 12 guns, all at short range. Calef held his ground gloriously, worked his guns deliberately with great judgment and skill, and with wonderful effect on the enemy.

At about 10:00 A.M., the Confederate bombardment ceased and minutes later their 3,000 man line swept down from Herr Ridge. Two miles away, on the Emmitsburg Road, John Reynolds was ordering fence rails torn out to enable his blue infantry to cut across fields on a direct beeline to the Lutheran Seminary. Observing the Confederate line from McPherson's Ridge, John Calef later wrote that "their battle flags looked redder and bloodier in the strong July sun than I had ever seen them before." The stakes of the game race that John Buford had set in motion were immense. The next half-hour would determine whether the Army of the Potomac could retain a chance at saving the high ground.

Buford's line very quickly felt the shock. Despite their rapid and withering carbine fire, the heavy Rebel infantry began to pressing them hard. To the north of the pike, part of the 6th NY was feared overrun and captured, although they managed to escape at the last moment. In a few minutes, the Rebels had closed to within pointblank range. Buford himself directed one of Calef's guns near the railroad cut, and fired into men literally at the muzzle of the piece. By 19:30 A.M., fighting was becoming hand-to-hand and Buford's entire line was on the verge of collapse.

Just then, almost miraculously, John Reynolds appeared with a column of Union infantry, moving briskly across the meadow at the double quick. By now desperate, Colonel Gamble rode up to Reynolds to urge the men on. "Hurry up, General! They are breaking our lines." Major Beveridge, the 8th Illinois regimental commander, describes the urgency of the moment: "The moment was critical, two guns to one, three men to one. We could easily fall back and elude pursuit, but we were not to retreat, nor was it our habit to retreat. Looking to our left rear, we saw Wadsworth and Reynolds coming across the meadow.

Buford supervised the relief of his troopers as they stepped aside to let the infantry pick the fight on more equal terms. In the nick of time, Reynolds had come to his rescue and helped win the first phase in the fight to save the high ground. But, the fight was not over. Within minutes of arriving, Reynolds was dead and the battle passed into a second phase, a phase in which Buford's cavalry would become the rescuer.


TO SAVE THE FIRST CORPS

Freed from the responsibility of defending McPherson's Ridge, Buford now turned to the task of realigning his command to protect the Union flanks. The 8th Ill. was sent to the left to a position along the Fairfield Road in an orchard overlooking Willoughby Run. The remainder of Gamble's Brigade was pulled back to the Lutheran Seminary, where at about 2:00 P.M., Colonel Gamble posted half of the command behind the natural breastwork of a low stone wall which ran south from the Seminary along Seminary Ridge for half a mile. The other half was mounted and placed in the woods to the south of the McMillan Farm. These troop dispositions would pay a major dividend later that afternoon.

Meanwhile, Buford had not forgotten Colonel Devin's Brigade to the North. The 6th NY and three companies of the 9th NY were dispatched to the Harrisburg/Carlisle Road to support of the bulk of the 17th PA, which had been battling Ewell's skirmishers all morning. And, none too soon, since Ewell's Corps was now rolling in via the Carlisle Road. Lead elements of Rode's Division were driving Devin's troopers from Keckler's Hill and the Cobean Farm to the flat open plain one mile to the north of Gettysburg.

By 12:30 P.M., the Union army field command had devolved on General O.O. Howard, whose 11th Corps was arriving to fight alongside the 1st Corps. now led by General Abner Doubleday, in replacement of John Reynolds, Although Buford remained with Gamble's Brigade, he retained contact with Devin and was able to inform General Howard that the Confederates were massing three or four miles north of town. When the 11th Corps was shattered later that day, no one could say that Buford had not provided advance warning. Here, as at Second Manassas, his intelligence was impeccable, In the meantime, Devin's troopers moved a mile to the Southeast to protect the Federal right along the York Road. While there, they came briefly under fire from a Union battery on Cemetery Hill which had mistaken them for Rebel infantry.

But Devin's men were not the only ones experiencing difficulty that afternoon. To his chagrin, young John Calef's battery was commandeered by General Wadsworth and sent to McPherson's Ridge to plug a hole left by a Maine battery that had been battered to bits. Threatened with arrest by Wadsworth, Calef arrived there to find himself alone and being pounded by thirty Rebel cannons. Threading his way through wounded men who begged him not to let his guns run over them, Calef fell back exhausted to Gamble's post at the stone wall to the south of the Lutheran Seminary.

By mid-afternoon both Union infantry corps were in danger of being overwhelmed. Feeling the strain, Buford wrote to General Pleasonton at 3:20 P.M.: "A tremendous battle has been raging since 9:30 A.M. with varying success. At the present moment, the battle is raging on the road to Cashtown within short cannon range of this town. The enemy's line is in a semicircle on the heights from north to south. General Reynolds was killed this morning. In my opinion, there seems to be no directing person. P.S. We need help now. (Pleasonton that day sent a message ordering Buford to "dispute every inch of ground.")

Buford also took the unusual step of writing directly to General Meade, begging him to send the 2nd Corps commander Winfield Scott Hancock "For God's sake, send up Hancock. Everything is going to odds. Reynolds is killed and we need a controlling spirit."

By 4:00 P.M., the Union 1st Corps had been driven back to Seminary Ridge and was fought to the edge of exhaustion. Sensing the moment of the kill, Rebel division commander Dorsey Pender launched an all-out attack from McPherson Ridge with some 4,200 infantry. As the Confederates surged forward on a mile long line from the Cashtown Road to the Fairfield Road, the ingenuity of Buford's earlier deployment became obvious. First of all, near the Fairfield Road Major Beveridge led his 8th Illinois out of the trees as if to mount a charge against Lane's Brigade, on the Confederate right flank. This faint prompted Lane to stop to deploy against the Illinoisans, thereby taking this brigade out of the fight while stripping Pender of one third of his force.

Somewhat later, as Perrin's South Carolina Brigade moved past Lane's on the inside, its own right flank became exposed to Gamble's 600 dismounted troopers behind the stone wall. Their carbines now erupted into a sheet of flame, with Calef's guns providing additional punch. In consequence, the 12th and 13th South Carolina were shot to pieces, losing a third of their combined strength.

Eventually the remainder of Perrin's Brigade broke through at the Seminary, but thanks to the 8th Illinois, Calef's guns and Gamble's dismounted marksmen, the Confederate rout of the 1st Corps was not nearly the disaster that it might have been. Colonel Gamble was entirely justified in claming that "the stand we made against the enemy prevented our left flank from being turned and saved a division of infantry." Furthermore, one of Perrin's officers reported that "Gamble's mounted and dismounted cavalry held their protected line until the 1st and 14th SC regiments were in or near town in pursuit of General Doubleday..." which leads to the conclusion that Buford's cavalry may have been the last Union troops to retreat for Seminary Ridge.

Over to the North, Devin's men were having adventures of their own in covering the tumultuous retreat of the 11th Corps through town. One trooper remembered the brigade as handling itself in an "orderly manner, skirmishing with the Rebels at close quarter with revolvers, answering Rebel yells with ringing cheers." Near Cemetery Hill, two companies of the 9th NY made a dismounted assault and drove some Rebels back into town. Finally, at about 5:00 P.M., Devin rejoined Buford and Gamble as the division was drawn up "unshaken and undaunted" on the high ground a mile southwest of Cemetery Hill (near the current town recreation park).

With three hours of daylight remaining, there was plenty of time for Lee's subordinates to launch an assault to prevent General Hancock from consolidating the Federal position on Culp's and Cemetery Hill, and Cemetery Ridge. But they hesitated, and it is possible that Buford's bristling front gave them pause. General Gouverneur Kemble Warren observed that Buford's division was "all in a line between our position (Cemetery Hill) and the enemy. Our cavalry presented a very handsome front, and I think probably checked the advance of the enemy." More likely, the Confederates hesitated as a result of the intelligence blackout caused by the absence of Stuart's cavalry. Although the luck of the march had given them a three to two advantage, not enough Confederate commanders realized the value of the ground that John Buford had handsomely reconnoitered and helped hold for John Reynolds and later Union infantry. Thus, the Confederate's high command allowed the fighting to subside.

In John Buford's own mind, the first days action at Gettysburg was probably all in another days work. He had been constantly in the saddle since Stoneman's Raid and the days were beginning to run together. He was, of course, proud of his men and aware that they had performed brilliantly in an exceptional situation. But, by sunset, Buford the professional was undoubtedly looking ahead, thinking of logistics and wondering where he could obtain forage for his horses. The battle had barely begun and he had miles to ride before the campaign was over.


IN PURSUIT OF LEE

That night Buford's men camped to the front of the Round Tops, with Devin's Brigade providing pickets to the area west of the Peach Orchard. On the morning of July 2, Calef unlimbered his guns near the orchard, and elements of the 6th and 9th NY were dispatched to assist Hiram Berdan's US Sharpshooters in skirmishing against A.P. Hill's troops. By noon, they pulled back to rejoin the division, which had been ordered to Westminster Maryland, twenty-five miles southeast, to guard the army wagon trains. Leaving one squadron of the 9th NY behind, John Buford left Gettysburg for good.

Unfortunately, his departure had the effect of leaving the Union left flank unguarded and "up in the air." Quite possibly, General Dan Sickles used the development as a pretext for moving the Union 3rd Corps out to the Emmitsburg Road, an act which in turn left Little Round Top, a key eminence, unguarded. Buford has been criticized on the grounds that he requested to be relieved and sent to Westminster, and that he improperly left his post before the relief arrived. The facts, however, suggest otherwise. Pleasonton ordered Buford to depart, with Meade's approval, and the error was Pleasonton's in not having the relief immediately at hand.

Buford's column arrived in Westminster the following day, July 3, the same day that Pickett's Charge and southern hopes were dashed against the "high ground" that Buford had chosen. For his exhausted troopers, this meant their first rest in eight days. In one officer's account, the horses seemed to have been equally used up: "Our supplies have been out for two days and horses are growing lank." If Buford did indeed request relief in order to rest and refit, he appears to have had ample grounds.

On the same day back in Gettysburg, General Wesley Merritt's Reserve Brigade engaged in a sharp skirmish south of the main battlefield along the Emmitsburg Road. Too late in arriving to be of any assistance to Buford, these troopers had been temporarily attached to General Judson Kilpatrick's 3rd Cavalry Division. Merritt also dispatched Major Sam Starr's 6th US Cavalry to capture Confederate supplies near Fairfield, only to have them collide with "Grumble" Jones entire brigade. Consequently, the 6th took a battering, losing 51 percent of its strength, by far the heaviest losses of any cavalry regiment at Gettysburg. By contrast, on July 1, Buford himself suffered 143 casualties, which is surely testament to his tactical dispositions and skilled handling of men.

For Gamble's and Devin's Brigades, the respite was brief. On July 4th, General Meade ordered Pleasonton to put the cavalry "in the rear" of Lee's shattered, though still dangerous, army. Not surprisingly, the 1st Division was put on the road to lead the pursuit, arriving the next day in Frederick, Maryland, where they were joined by Merritt's Brigade.

While on the march, Buford had occasion to dispense swift frontier justice to yet another Confederate spy. When a suspicious civilian entered camp on July 5 and began asking questions about troop movements, the General studied the man, and then ordered him arrested. This unfortunate character, identified as "Mr. Harris" or "Mr. Richardson," was found to be carrying passes from General Lee and Longstreet. Upon learning this, Buford said simply, "Hang him from that tree," and never left his seat or stopped puffing on his pipe while the man was strung up.

On July 6th, the division moved on, riding twenty-five miles toward Williamsport. MD. where General Lee's army was preparing to make its escape across the Potomac. Three miles east of town, Buford butted into a makeshift Confederate force led by John Imboden. This clash opened a five-day stretch of fighting as intense as any he had experienced at Gettysburg. Although his men came close to breaking Imboden's line, by nightfall the division had fallen back toward Boonsboro, MD.

On July 10th, Buford pitched into Stuart at Funkstown, MD, and was again out in front in the thick of it. In fact, a bullet passed through his blouse, cutting five holes. By now however, the General's nerves were becoming frayed. He was angry that the 6th Infantry Corps, which had come up from behind, had settled in to boil coffee, despite the fact that his troopers were obviously driving the Rebels back. An apple to the Corps commander brought no assistance, only a response that General Sedgwick was unwilling to risk bringing on a "general engagement." Buford's exasperation is apparent in the subsequent messages to Pleasonton: "I have been fighting F. Lee, Hampton's and Jones and have driven them back.... I don't care about going any further just now. I will cease firing and watch their movements."

On July 11th, the division was pulled out and transferred to the far left of the Union line. For the next three days, in fog and rain, it kept watch over Confederate entrenchments on the Potomac near present day Downsville, MD. Finally, on the 14th, Meade ordered an attack, but by then, most of the Rebels had slipped across the river. Buford's men were able to overrun Lee's rearguard at Falling Waters and take 500 prisoners (which ironically included a number of Heth's men), but the Gray Fox himself had gotten away and the Gettysburg Campaign was at an end.

During the rearguard fight, there occurred a poignant incident which illustrates the degree of devotion that John Buford could inspire in his men. According to Abner Hard, a wounded trooper was brought in and placed in close proximity to Buford. Without seeing him or being aware of his presence, the man remarked: "I am glad it's not the General who is wounded." Upon hearing this, obviously touched, Buford's eyes welled with tears.


"I AM DISGUSTED AND WORN OUT"

One of the more neglected phases of Civil War history is the four month stretch of fighting following the Gettysburg campaign. Most eastern theater historians tend to skip directly from Gettysburg to Grant's 1864 Wilderness campaign, paying little attention to the tremendous maneuvering and fighting between Meade and Lee, August-November 1863. Even less attention is paid to the furious cavalry action of the period, which is unfortunate, because it is during this phase, not later, under General Phil Sheridan, that Union cavalry ascendancy was won in the East.

But at a dreadful cost. Whatever hardships Buford's division had suffered in the stretch between Stoneman's Raid and Falling Waters along with 1,813 casualties, the pace was soon to become even more grueling. Sad to say, their commander was already a sick and aging man. His friend John Gibbon noted that Buford was having physical problems even during the Gettysburg Campaign. "He suffered terribly from rheumatism, and for days together could not mount a horse without help, but once mounted would remain in the saddle all day." At 37, Buford was badly used up, but was too dedicated and too conscientious to leave the fight. By electing to stay, he was in effect, signing his own death warrant.

On July 18, the 1st Division crossed the Potomac into Northern Virginia. After an unsuccessful attempt to penetrate the Confederate cavalry screen at Chester and Manassas Gaps, Buford regrouped his brigades at Barbee's Crossroads and proceeded to Warrenton to stand picket along the Rappahannock River. Then, on August 1st, General Meade ordered him across to conduct a reconnaissance in force that would kindle into the Second Battle of Brandy Station.

At 11:00 A.M., with the temperature 100 degrees in the shade, Buford's men splashed across the river at Kelly's Ford. In passing through the old Brandy Station battlefield, he encountered Rebel cavalry which he drove before him toward Culpepper. Enemy resistance stiffened considerably when Jeb Stuart brought up none other than "Grumble" Jones' Brigade. On the grounds of the Botts Mansion, three miles east of Culpepper, Buford and Jones charged to and fro, pummeling each other in the sweltering heat. By late afternoon, Buford recognized the futility of the exercise. His division fell back exhausted to the Rappahannock and the safety of the 1st Corps Line. In his own words, it was "a very severe day on men and horses. I, myself, am worthless."

Suffering deep fatigue, Buford was now blind-sided by family tragedy. At some point in early August, he received word that his twenty-five year old daughter Pattie had died, after a severe illness. During the same phase, on August 3rd, he was ordered to make a second reconnaissance across the Rappahannock toward the Rapidan. Through an incredible mix-up in orders, 12th Corps commander Henry Slocum countermanded Pleasonton's dispatch to Buford and withdrew his corps north across the Rappahannock, thereby leaving Devin's Brigade out on a limb. Alarmed at the development, Devin reported to Buford, who in turn wrote Pleasonton one of the more explosive dispatches in the official records: "I am disgusted and worn out with the system that seems to prevail. There is so much apathy and so little disposition to fight and cooperate that I wish to be relieved from the Army of the Potomac. I do not wish to put myself and soldiers in the front where I cannot get support short of 12 miles. The ground I gain I would like to hold. The reconnaissance I made on August 1 was a success, yet the 1st Corps gets the credit for saving me from disaster. I am willing to serve my country, but do not wish to sacrifice the brave men under my command."

Fortunately, Pleasonton ignored Buford's request for relief. Much to his credit, he took the step of complaining to General Meade, who censured Slocum for his violation of the chain of command. By August 4, however, almost half of the cavalry corps was on sick call, and half the horses were reported as diseased. Buford's division was driven back nearly a mile that day by Stuart's troopers; heavy skirmishing continued until August 8th, when Buford was finally granted ten days leave to visit his wife.

Arriving in Georgetown, Kentucky, he found the family grieving not only his daughter, but also his father in law and a sister in law, all of whom apparently died within a ten day period. In writing to his old West Point comrade, Ambrose Burnside, he described his wife's family as being "almost broken hearted." He went on to ask the favor that his mother in law be permitted to visit Pattie's cousin, Basil Dake, one of Morgan's Raiders imprisoned in Columbus, Ohio. In the same letter, Buford vented some spleen concerning the poor state of leadership within the Army of the Potomac: "It is the same state as when you left. The same faults exist among corps commanders as always existed. Too much apathy, too much cold water." Ironically, Burnside was one of the corps commanders who had helped create the conditions that Buford was complaining about.

General Buford returned to action in early September, just in time to lead another foray across the Rappahannock. On September 13, he forded the river with two brigades and rode once again toward Culpepper. Almost immediately he ran into "Grumble" Jones Brigade, now commanded by General Lunsford Lomax (Jones had been relieved by Stuart following one of their many and legendary arguments.) The Battle of Third Brandy Station was on, and the ensuing melee was in many ways similar to earlier engagements. Buford turned his men south and attacked Colonel R. I. T. Beale's Brigades at Pony Mountain, a dominant piece of high ground three miles to the southeast of Culpepper. He then ordered them to storm the heights, a task they accomplished before darkness descended.

The following day, Buford drove south to Raccoon Ford on the Rapidan River. Here the Confederates dug in their heels, massing cavalry, infantry and artillery in front of the ford. Buford tried the Rebel line nonetheless, sending in the single brigade at his disposal. But the troopers were stopped by withering artillery fire, and Buford had a close call as a shell with a burning fuse landed near himself and his staff. In the nick of time, they galloped away, and at dusk the stubborn Rebels fell back across the Rapidan.

For another week, the stalemate continued as Meade and Lee pondered their options. Buford was summoned to Meade's headquarters on September 21 to advise on a plan to turn Lee's strong position on the Rapidan. Sifting among his choices, Meade decided to conduct a reconnaissance to explore the possibility of turning Lee's left flank in the Robertson River Madison Court House area.

On September 22, while conducting this reconnaissance near Jack's Shop (now Rochelle, VA), Buford encountered a large Confederate force led by JEB Stuart himself. Since Devin's Brigade was absent on a scout, he found himself outnumbered three to one, but in a skillful maneuver, was able to dismount his remaining brigade while sending a courier to General Kilpatrick, requesting that he attack with his division from the South, Kilpatrick responded quickly and came within a hair of crushing Stuart. In one of his more daring exploits, however, the Gray Cavalier managed to cut his way out and flee south. Buford joined the five-mile pursuit before being forced back by Rebel infantry at Liberty Mills. Calling his mission a triumph, he then withdrew to the Robertson River to inform Meade that he indeed discovered a vulnerable Confederate Flank. Unfortunately, the Confederate victory at Chickamauga in northern Georgia caused the transfer of Meade's 11th corps and 12th corps, thus forcing him to abandon plans for an offensive. For the next two weeks, the armies faced each other in static positions across the Rapidan and Robertson Rivers.

To reach safety, Buford fought his way through Morton's Ford, Stevensburg and on to the old Brandy Station battlefields with an artful blend of mounted charges and dismounted tactics, punctuated by horse artillery. The feat of running the ten-mile Confederate gauntlet may well have been Buford's finest tactical hour. While his own exhausted troopers rode up Fleetwood Hill, Kilpatrick's Division was being driven back from Culpepper from the Southwest. Sensing an opportunity, Jeb Stuart surrounded Kilpatrick as he retreated toward Buford's position. What followed would become Cavalry legend. In an attempt to open a lane through which Kilpatrick's men could retreat, Buford ordered Devin to lead a charge of the 6th and 9th NY Cavalry. From the opposite direction, young General Custer led an equally gallant charge towards Devin. This combined action enabled Kilpatrick's beleaguered men to escape to join Buford on Fleetwood Hill. One can imagine the latter's frustration when, once again, Newton's 1st Corps failed to support the cavalry, in this, the fourth Battle of Brandy Station. At twilight, the Federal horse soldiers were able to make their getaway across the Rappahannock.

Incredibly, the very next day Buford was ordered back across the Rappahannock to lead an advance by three Union infantry corps. Thus, for the fifth time in three months, his division rode the bloody path to Brandy Station. Here, his troopers skirmished all day with Hampton's old brigade and finally drove it from the field, thereby enabling them to recover their wounded from the day before, a result that Buford found "truly gratifying."

Nonetheless, General Lee had managed to slip around the Union right flank, and on October 14, the two armies fought a bloody, though inconclusive, battle at Bristoe Station, after which Meade withdrew to a defensive line around Fairfax, Virginia. During this fight, Buford's men drew the assignment of guarding the ponderous army wagon trains, and skirmished constantly throughout the day without losing a single man. In the following week, General Meade decided to pursue Lee to the South, and to bring his own army to Warrenton on the Rappahannock line. There, on October 19, one of Meade's staff officers noted ominously that General Buford was feeling "cold and tired and wet." In fact, his health was beginning to deteriorate badly.

Two weeks later, General Meade decided to have "one more go'' at General Lee before winter set in. This affair would become known as the Mine Run campaign and on November 7, John Buford embarked on his final ride. Leading the division across Hazel River, he directed the column toward Culpepper. This time however, there would be light resistance, thus precluding a sixth Brandy Station. By now, thanks in part to Buford, Union cavalry had the whip hand. Unfortunately, by now, Buford was also very sick, too sick to remain in the field. On November 19, Colonel Lyman observed that "we find the cavalry chief afflicted with rheumatism, which he bore with his usual philosophy." Two days later he was gone, the Army would never see him again.


"PUT GUARDS ON THE ROAD BUFORD IS DEAD"

The general was taken to Washington, where it became apparent that he was dangerously sick. Although we will never know the precise nature of his final illness, the physical symptoms indicated either typhus, pneumonia, rheumatism, exhaustion, or some combination thereof. Of course, the primary cause of illness had been the condition of his service and the zeal with which he had performed his duty. His friend John Gibbon summed up the matter thusly: "It has been stated thirty days continuous campaigning is the limit... and yet here was a body of man (Buford's) which commencing with the labors of Stoneman's Raid through the operations preceding, during and following the Battle of Gettysburg and afterwards during which there was almost no rest whatever for the cavalry ... the infantry and artillery could get some rest, the cavalry none... Buford, one of the most hard working of commanders fell victim to the strain."

From late April on, John Buford had been a man of constant care, living with increasing pain and an ever deepening sense of frustration and personal sorrow. As a cavalry commander, his burdens had been those of the man who rides point and lives on the perimeter, who must see and know all, far in advance of the infantry and everyone else. It was sadly ironic that the sequence of events that had allowed him to exercise his talents in full measure had also worn him to a frazzle and put him at death's door.

Nonetheless, in his final days, the General exuded cheer and even discussed the possibility of returning to duty as a commander of Cavalry in the West. Captain George Sanford recalls the conversation and the scene: "It was evident he (Buford) was a very sick man.... However, he was bright and cheerful... He then asked me if we were aware that he had been offered command in the West. He said 'Well its true. I have been offered command of all cavalry in the West and have replied that I will accept on one condition, that I may be allowed to take my own brigade (the reserve brigade).... Now I want you to give the news to the men and have it understood that I wish no promotion that would separate me from them.'"

By mid December, however, it was obvious that Buford was dying. On December 16th, General Stoneman initiated the proposal that Buford be promoted to Major General, and President Lincoln assented, writing as follows: "I am informed that General Buford will not survive the day. It suggests itself to me that he will be made Major General for distinguished and meritorious service at the Battle of Gettysburg." Informed of the promotion, Buford inquired doubtfully, "Does he mean it?" When assured the promotion was genuine, he replied simply, "It is too late, now I wish I could live."

In the last hours, Buford was attended by his loyal aid, Captain Myles Keogh, and by Edward, his servant. Also present were Lt. Colonel A. J. Alexander and General Stoneman. His wife Pattie was enroute from Rock Island, Illinois, but would not arrive in time. Near the end, he became delirious and began admonishing the servant, but then, in a moment of clarity, called for the man and apologized: "Edward, I hear that I have been scolding you. I did not know what I was doing. You have been a faithful servant, Edward." The servant wept.

John Buford died at 2:00 PM, December 15, 1863, while George Keogh held him in his arms. His final reported words make a fitting epitaph for a faithful regular officer of the United States Army: "Put guards on all the roads, and don't let the men run to the rear." With this soldier, there had always been the Devil to pay, now the Devil was paid in full.


EPILOGUE

On December 20, memorial services were held at a church on the corner of H. Street and New York Avenue in Washington, DC. President Lincoln was among the mourners, although Pattie Buford was unable to attend due to illness. The pallbearers included General's Casey, Heinzelman, Sickles, Schofield, Hancock, Doubleday, and Warren. General Stoneman commanded the escort in a procession that included "Grey Eagle" (Buford's old white horse from Gettysburg ).

After the service, Captain Keogh and Wadsworth escorted his body to West Point, where it was buried fittingly, alongside fellow Gettysburg hero, Lt Alonzo Cushing, who had died defending the "High ground" (Cemetery Ridge) that Buford had chosen. In 1865, a large twenty-five foot obelisk style monument was erected over his grave. Buford's son James Duke Buford died in 1874 at age 18, his widow Pattie remarried a reverend McCown of Versailles, Kentucky. She died in 1903.

In 1865, members of his old division financed a bronze statue of the General to be erected on the Gettysburg Battlefield. The monument sculpted by James Kelly, is located where Lt. Roder's section of Calef's battery stood on McPherson's Ridge. At the base is gun #233, the piece that fired the first Union artillery shot of the battle. Buford's likeness stands there today, binoculars in hand on the front line, peering ahead, ever vigilant.


THE END


I hope you have all enjoyed my telling of the story of General John Buford and his Men.
Tom Gladwell

Copyright © 2001 Tom Gladwell
(email: TUBES14@aol.com)
All Rights Reserved


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